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The Johnson Act and Utility Rate
Making in Ohio
JOSEPH S. PLATrT*
On May 14, 1934, Congress passed the Johnson Act'
restricting the jurisdiction of the federal district courts in rela-
tion to state utility rate controversies. The paragraph of the
Judicial Code conferring jurisdiction in cases of diversity of
citizenship or arising under the United States Constitution was
amended by insertion of the following sentence:
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, no
district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend, or
restrain the enforcement, operation, or execution of any order of an
administrative board or commission of a State, or any rate-making body
of any political subdivision thereof, or to enjoin, suspend, or restrain any
action in compliance with any such order, where jurisdiction is based
solely upon the ground of diversity of citizenship, or the repugnance of
such order to the Constitution of the United States, where such order
(i) affects rates chargeable by a public utility, (2) does not interfere
with interstate commerce, and (3) has been made after reasonable
notice and hearing, and where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may
be had at law or in equity in the courts of such State.
Prior to this amendment the federal district courts had juris-
diction to grant injunctive relief against state administrative
boards and municipalities in utility rate cases involving the issue
* Member of the Columbus Bar. Acknowledgment is made of the valu-
able preliminary research work on the Johnson Act done by Robert H. Jones
(J. D. Ohio State, 1939; Sterling Fellow at Yale Law School, 1939-40).
148 Stat. 775; z8 U.S.C.A., Section 41(1), Section 24(I) of the
Judicial Code.
On the Johnson Act generally see the following articles and comments:
Heinman and Vail, The Jolnson Act: A Return to State Indepetzdene
(935) 30 ILL. L. REV. z15; Cullen, Legislative Restriction of Federal Jur-
isdiction Over Local Rate Regulation (1935) 20 ST. Louis L. REV. 308;
(1937) 5o HARv. L. REV. 813; (1934) 44 YAL L. J. ii9; (1936) 35
MICH. L. REV. 274; (1934) zo IowA L. REV. iz8; (1936) 34 MICH L.
REV. 1257; (936) 21 ST. Louis L. REV. 163; (935) 35 COL. L. REV.
943; (1936) I4TEXAs L. REV. REV. 55 1
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of confiscation, and hence a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.2 Such jurisdiction has
not often been invoked in Ohio,3 nor indeed in other states,4
but the magnitude of the interests involved in utility rate cases
gives them an importance out of all proportion to their number.
The purpose of this article is to consider the Ohio law governing
utility rate-making, and the remedies available in the state
courts for review of rate-making orders and ordinances, in
relation to the conditions laid down in the Johnson Act upon
the basis of which federal jurisdiction is denied.
Since its passage in 1934 the Act has been considered by
the federal courts in perhaps a score of cases. Its constitution-
ality was upheld in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. City of
Jackson,' against the argument that jurisdiction once conferred
upon the district courts cannot be withdrawn in whole or in
part.' Certain minor questions of interpretation have been
raised and disposed of. The application of the Act to pending
cases was considered in Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Public Service
Commission. The argument that when diversity of citizenship'
'Such jurisdiction was, and of course still is, restricted by Section z66
of the Judicial Code, z8 U.S.C.A., Section 38o. An interlocutory injunction
could be granted only by a statutory three-judge court, including one judge
of the Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Moreover, if an
action to enforce the rate-making order were brought in the state court and
a stay granted, federal proceedings were suspended, under an amendment to
this section adopted in 1913. Only four states (Arizona, Nebraska, New York
and Wisconsin) adopted the legislation necessary to take advantage of this
provision. See Senate Reports No. iz5, pt. 2, 73rd Cong., ist Session (933).
3 See Van Wert Gaslight Co. v. P.U.C., 299 Fed. 670 (S.D. Ohio,
1924); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. P.U.C., 3 F. (2d) 701 (S.D. Ohio, 1924);
Cols. Gas and Fuel Co. v. Columbus, 17 F. (2d) 630 (S.D. Ohio, 1927);
55 F. (2d) 56 (C.C.A., 6th Circ., 1931). Compare Cols. Gas and Fuel Co.
v. Columbus, 42 F. (2d) 379 (C.C.A., 6th Circ., i93o).
See minority report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senate
Reports, No. 125, Pt. 2, 73rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1933).
9 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss., 1935).
o The court relied on Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 26o U.S. 226 (1922),
and the historical development of the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
8 F. Supp. 8o6 (W.D. Mo., 1934).
Although in the majority report in the Senate (Senate Reports No. 125,
73 Cong., Ist Sess.) much space is devoted to this question of diversity of
citizenship, it would seem to be of little practical importance. If utility rates
270 LAW JOURNAL- JUNE, 1940
and a constitutional question are both present as jurisdictional
grounds the Act does not apply, was rejected in the Jackson
case. The application of the Act to a municipal ordinance as
the "order" of a "rate-making body" was approved in East
O o Gas Co. v. City of Cleveland.9 Otherwise all the ques-
tions raised and considered in the federal courts under the Act
have involved the application of clause (3) which prescribes
as conditions to the denial of federal jurisdiction: (a) that the
rate order "has been made after reasonable notice and hear-
ing'; and (b) that "a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may
be had at law or in equity in the courts of such State."
REASONABLE NOTICE AND HEARING
In Ohio, utility rates are fixed in the first instance either by
municipal ordinance under authority of the General Code'
or, in the absence of an ordinance, by order of the Public
Utilities Commission under authority of General Code, Sec-
tions 614-2oo et seq., defining the authority of the comnis-
sion with respect to rate schedules filed with it by utilities."
are involved, a question of confiscation under the Fourteenth Amendment will
almost inevitably be presented. But compare Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v.
Public Service Com. of Ky., 304 U.S. 2o9 (1938), a Johnson Act decision in
which jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship; Red Ball Transit
Co. v. Marshall, 8 F. (2d) 635, S.D. Ohio, 1925.
Note that OHIo GENERAL CODE, Sec. 614-73, restricts public utility
operation to Ohio corporations.
S94. F. (2d) 443 (C.C.A. 6th Circ., 1938); aff'g 23 F. Supp. 965
(N.D. Ohio, 1938), cert. den. 303 U.S. 657.
10 Section 3982 authorizes municipal regulation of gas, electric and
water rates. Such authority is confirmed by Section 614-44.
Section 3644 authorizes municipal regulation in companies supplying
steam and hot water, such power to be reserved in the franchise ordinance.
It appears doubtful whether a municipality may regulate telephone rates,
although it may contract with respect thereto when it authorizes the laying
of conduits under Sections 9197 and 9198. City of Columbus v. P.U.C.,
103 Ohio St. 79 (1921).
Regulation of street railway fares and transportation rates generally are
beyond the scope of this article, although such companies are defined as "public
utilities" by Sections 614-z and 614-2a.
See also OHio CoNsTruTioN, Article XVIII, Sections 3, 4 and 5.
" Section 614-20 provides for applications for rate changes to be filed,
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Municipal Rate Ordinances
Can it be said that municipal rate ordinances are enacted
after "reasonable notice and hearing" within the meaning of
the Act? Congress unquestionably intended to include such
rate ordinances among the orders granted immunity from
attack in the federal courts. The words "or any rate-
making body of any political subdivision thereof" were inserted
by amendment from the floor of the House for this very pur-
pose." Yet the statutory provisions governing the passage of
ordinances generally are adapted to meet the the requirements
of legislative proceedings and contemplate no such notice or
hearing as would be required for a judicial or quasi-judicial
determination. The "readings" required by General Code,
Sections 35 15-54 and 4224 may be dispensed with- by vote of
the council, and the notice required by Section 4239 is to
council members only. General Code, Section 3982, authoriz-
ing the enactment of rate ordinances, provides for no notice or
hearing, although some specific charter provisions applicable to
franchise ordinances do make such a requirement."8
Two classes of cases have arisen under the "reasonable
notice and hearing" clause of the Act as applied to municipal
rate ordinances. First are cases in which the utility was not in
fact given reasonable notice nor an opportunity to be heard.
Clearly, under such circumstances, the Act would be no bar
to the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court, and such
was the conclusion of the court in City of El Paso v. Texas
with accompanying schedules, with the commission, and the procedure with
respect thereto.
Section 614-Z3 permits the commission to substitute its own rate schedule,
after hearing and upon certain findings.
Compare Sections 499-8 et seq., providing for valuation proceedings by
the commission in connection with rate making. On the question whether the
jurisdiction of the federal courts could have been invoked prior to the Johnson
Act on the issue of valuation alone, see Van Wert Gaslight Co. v. P. U. C.,
supra, note 3, holding that no justiciable federal question is reached until the
rate is actually fixed.
12 Cong. Rec. Vol. 78 pt. 8, p. 8431.
13 See Cleveland Charter, Section 186.
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Cities Gas Co.. 14 where a rate reduction ordinance was rushed
through council on short notice and without formal hearing.
In the second class of cases the utility is in fact given ample
notice and an opportunity to be heard, but such notice and
hearing are not accorded pursuant to any statutory requirement.
In Mississippi Power Co. v. City of Aberdeen,5 the federal dis-
trict court for the Northern District of Mississippi held that "the
failure of the statute to provide for notice and hearing," despite
actual notice and a fair hearing, rendered the Act inapplicable.
The court recognized that this holding was contrary to the
holding in the Jackson case,' decided four months previously
in the Southern District of Mississippi. The case of East Ohio
Gas Co. v. City of Cleveland" appears to settle this question for
Ohio and the Sixth Circuit. Following is a quotation from the
opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals:
Whether the giving of notice and an opportunity for hearing was
or was not essential to the validity of the order is immaterial, for ade-
quate notice and hearing were given, as found by the court.
Reasonable notice and hearing, then, are not dependent
upon the existence of statutory requirements. What will be
held to constitute such notice and hearing, in fact, is still an
open question."8
14 1o0 F. (?d) 5Ol (C.C.A. 5th Circ., 1938); the court refrained from
exercising jurisdiction in this case for reasons of "comity." See also Georgia
Tel. Co. v. Ga. Public Service Com., 8 F. Supp. 43. (N.D. Ga., 1934).
15 11 F. Supp. 951 (i935).
168 Supra, note 5.
17 Supra, note 9. In his discussion of this point the district judge calls
attention to the fact that the Aberdeen case is probably in conflict with Home
Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, zI U.S. 265 (19o8) on this question of actual
as distinguished from statutory notice and hearing.
"s The district judge in the East Ohio case (23 F. Supp. 965, supra, note
9) emphasizes the legislative character of the proceedings: "In contrast [to the
quasi-judicial proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission], the
ordinances involved here were not the final legislative steps in the establish-
ment of the rates, nor subject to judicial review upon any record. They were
initial steps in the legislative scheme for establishing rates, were not binding
on plaintiff against its objection, but, on complaint to the Commission, were
subject either to be ratified or stricken down. The council proceeded legisla-
tively, and, in the absence of any controlling statute, the notice and hearing
required before it is controlled by the legislative, as distinguished from the
quasi-judicial, character of its act."
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Orders of the Public Utilities Commission
The question of "reasonable notice and hearing" is not so
likely to arise in connection with rate-fixing orders of the Public
Utilities Commission. The statutory requirements appear to
be adequate and complete. See General Code, Sections 614-2o
et seq. and 614-44 et seq." But the case of Petroleum Explor-
ation Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Kentucky"0 decided
by the United States Supreme Court in 1938 does indicate a
possible point of controversy. The state commission had issued
without previous notice a so-called "Notice of Investigation
and Order to Show Cause" which in fact included an order to
produce certain evidence on a designated date. It was held that
the absence of any prior notice rendered the Act inapplicable."'
The opinion is by Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Stone con-
curring, "except that he expresses no opinion on the appli-
cability of the Johnson Act." The company, a foreign
corporation, claimed not to be subject to the Kentucky regu-
latory statutes and contended that the expense to be incurred
in complying with the order to produce evidence would involve
irreparable injury. This case would seem to be of limited
application. Ordinarily, if the company to be investigated is
clearly subject to regulation, no justiciable question of confisca-
tion is reached until the commission by final order fixes the
rates." Moreover, any question as to the application of the Act
probably could be avoided in practice by the commission simply
by refraining from coupling any sort of "order" with its orig-
inal "notice," in initiating the investigation of a company not
theretofore regulated.23
S' See also Sections 499-Iz et seq., relative to valuations, and Sections
524, 5z8 and 538, applying to railroads.
20 Supra, note 8.
211 Note that jurisdiction was actually not exercised in the interest of
"preserving the autonomy of the states."
22 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 21o (i9o8) ; Van Wert
Gaslight Co. v. P. U. C., supra, note 3.
23 Compare the kind of citation issued in Cleveland v. P. U. C., 127 Ohio
St. 432 (1934).
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In two cases, Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission of Montana4 and Georgia Continental Tel Co. v.
Georgia Public Service Commission,"5 allegations of bias on
the part of commissioners, based upon pre-election anti-
utility statements, were held insufficient for a finding that the
company had not been accorded a "hearing" within the mean-
ing of the Act.
A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT REMEDY2"
i. The remedy must be "plain." The condition of the Act is
not met when the district court is confronted with a situation
of "uncertainty" 2 7 or "doubt" 2 as to the existence of the
required remedy in the state courts, or where "it is impossible
to know what position the courts of the State would take."'"
It was upon this ground apparently, the absence of a "plain"
remedy, that the district court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Western Division, assumed jurisdiction, despite the Act,
24 z2 F. Supp. 946 (D. Mont., 1935).
25 Supra, note 14.
26 See comments by Senator Conally relative to this phrase ("Danger lurks
in the language, it seems to me.") and by Senator Austin (urging inclusion of
the word "adequate"), Cong. Rec. Vol. 78, Pt. 2, pp. 1915 et seq.
In 1937 this same language was incorporated into a further amendment
to the same paragraph of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A., Section 41 (I),
restricting the jurisdiction of federal district courts in relation to state tax
controversies. For a discussion of the application of this amendment see Culp,
Powers of a Court of Equity irt State Tax Litigatioi, (940) 38 MICH. L.
REv. 61o. A few of the cases decided under the tax amendment have referred
to the Johnson Act and have relied upon Johnson Act cases. See, for example,
Printers and Pub. Co. v. Corbett, 25 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal., 1938); Phipps
v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, z6 F. Supp. 811 (W.D. Pa., 1939); aff'd,
iiI F. (zd) 393 (C.C.A., 3 d Circ., 1940), infra, note 67; Baker v. Atchison
T. & S. F. Ry., lo6 F. (zd) 525 (C.C.A. loth Circ., 1939), cert. den. 60
Sup. Ct. z96.
27 Corp. Com. of Okla. v. Cary, 296 U.S. 452 (i935).
28 See Okla. Packing Co. v. Okla. G. and E. Co., 6o Sup. Ct. 2i S
(1939), opinion withdrawn and substitute opinion filed, 309 U.S. 4 (1940);
see dissenting opinion in Baker v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., supra, note z6.
20 Mountain States Power Co. v. P. U. C. of Mont., z99 U.S. 167
(936); Printers and Pub. Co. v. Corbett, supra, note z6. Compare Mont.
Power Co. v. P. U. C. of Mont., supra, note z4.
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in a recent case," reciting in its order that "it is doubtful
whether the cited statutes provide for an appeal in this case."
2. The remedy must be judicial in character as distinguished
from legislative. It was so held in Corporation Commission of
Oklahoma v. Cary,"' the first case to come before the United
States Supreme Court under the Act. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court under its own prior decisions was authorized to act in a
legislative capacity, being required, if it disapproved an order
of the commission, to substitute its own order therefor. This is
a matter of substantial importance inasmuch as the appellate
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court under Article
III of the Constitution may not be invoked to review the legis-
lative action of state tribunals." It appears throughout the Con-
gressional debates on the Act that such review by the Supreme
Court was relied upon as the ultimate safeguard against state
action in violation of the federal constitution."
3. It is still uncertain whether the remedy must comply with
the rule of Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,"4
'0 Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. City of Toledo, in Equity,
No. 1581 (i937), aff'd without opinion, 90 F. (zd) 1003 (C.C.A. 6th
Circ., 1937). The case involved a six months ordinance superseding a
schedule filed with the commission. Apparently the availability of equitable
relief in the state courts was not considered.
• Supra, note 27.
32 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra, note 2 2; Keller v. Potomac
Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).
" Cong. Rec. Vol. 78, pt. 2, pp. 1915 et seq.
a: 253 U.S. 287 (1920). It may be questioned whether the Bet; Avon
rule still retains its full vigor. In United Gas Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123
(1938), it appears in the statement of facts that the burden of proof was there
placed upon the company to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the
rates were unreasonable, and the appellate court refers to a presumption in
favor of the validity of the commission's order. The Chief Justice, speaking
for the majority, does not refer to this point, but Justices McReynolds and
Butler emphasize it in their dissent, urging that the state law did not permit
an independent judgment on the facts. And in St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38 (936), the Chief Justice refers to the weight
which may be attached to commission findings, and requires the complainant
to maintain the burden of proving confiscation convincingly. See also the
concurring opinions in the St. Joseph Stockyards case just cited, and Driscoll
v. Edison Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1939), urging that Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466 (1898), be overruled, partly in the interest of the finality of administra-
tive findings. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
Ben Avoi; case, concurred in by Justices Holmes and Clark.
275
276 LAW JOURNAL-JUNE, 1940
requiring, as a condition of due process, that an opportunity be
afforded to submit the issue of confiscation "to a judicial tri-
bunal for determination upon its own independent judgment
as to both law and facts." In Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Lighzt
& Power Co.3" the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that the Act did not apply to Porto Rico upon the
ground, among others, that the statutory review of commission
orders failed to comply with the rule of the Ben Avon case.
In New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York " the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld the action of the district court in
declining to take jurisdiction, pointing out, without mentioning
the Act, that the remedy in equity in the state courts was
"within the requirements of the Ben Avon case." On the other
hand, in New Jersey Suburban Water Co. v. Board of Public
Utility Commissioners," the district court applying the Act
declined to take jurisdiction although an order of the New
Jersey commission could be set aside on appeal only upon a
finding that there was "no evidence before the board to support
the same reasonably."
4. It has been suggested by some writers38 that an "efficient
remedy" might conceivably be held to require a trial de novo
with the privilege of introducing new evidence before the
reviewing tribunal, thereby practically nullifying the Act in
many states, including Ohio, 9 where the reviewing court is
restricted to the commission's record. Such an extension would
be based upon two assumptions, first, that an "efficient remedy"
is one which complies in all respects with the requirements of
3 83 F. (zd) 26z (1936), cert. den. z98 U.S. 689.
36 ioz F. (2d) 453 (1939)-
37 23 F. Supp. 752 (D.N.J., 1938). The Ben Avon case is not men-
tioned in this opinion.
38 See 50 HARV. L. REv. 813, 820; 30 ILL. L. REv. Z15; 44 YALE L.
J. I 19; and other law review notes cited supra, note i.
3' OHio GENERAL CODE, Section 544 provides for the review of com-
mission orders by the Supreme Court on the record. Section 546 provides
for transmission of the record to the Supreme Court.
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due process," and second, that due process includes the right
to such a trial de novo. The principal support for this second
assumption would be found in Crowell v. Benson4' and a dictum
of Mr. Justice Butler in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United
States." It seems most unlikely that the Act will be so con-
strued in view of the well known disinclination of the present
United States Supreme Court majority to disturb the rulings
of administrative agencies.43
Moreover, during the period 1934-1937 on at least four
occasions rulings of the Ohio Supreme Court under General
Code, Section 544 (restricting the Court to a consideration of
the commission's record), were reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court; the scope of review under this statute was
twice referred to by the court, and, it may perhaps be said,
tacitly approved. Following is a quotation from the opinion
by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Ohio Bell Telephone v. Public
Utilities Commission:45
In Ohio the sole method of review is by petition in error to the
40 In view of the right of appeal to the United States Supreme Court from
the highest court of the state, a right which is unaffected by the Act, this
assumption may not be taken for granted.
41 285 U.S. 22 (1932). This case involved review in a federal court and
may have been based upon Article III of the United States Constitution defin-
ing the federal judicial power, rather than upon the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurred
in by Justices Stone and Roberts.
42 298 U.S. 349, 3 68 (1936): "The due process clause assures a full
hearing before the court or other tribunal empowered to perform the judicial
function involved. That includes the right to introduce evidence . . . and
have judicial findings based upon it." See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis, criticizing this statement.
'3 See authorities cited supra, note 34. And see Washington ex rel.
Oregon R. R. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510 (1912).
" Dayton Power and Light Co. v. P. U. C., 292 U.S. 290 (I934), aff'g
127 Ohio St. 137; Cols. G. and F. Co. v. P. U. C., 292 U.S. 398 (1934),
reversing 127 Ohio St. io9; West Ohio Gas Co. v. P. U. C., 294 U.S. 63
(1934), reversing i28 Ohio St. 301; Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. P. U. C., 301
U.S. 292 (937), reversing 131 Ohio St. 539. All these cases were com-
menced before the amendment of 1935 designating the review as an "appeal,"
in conformity with the new Appellate Procedure Act.
l' Supra, note 44. See also the opinion by Cardozo, J., in West Ohio
Gas Co. v. P.U.C., supra, note 44.
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Supreme Court of the State, which considers both the law and the
facts upon the record made below, and not upon new evidence.
The case resulted in reversal upon the ground that facts relied
on by the commission and the court did not appear in the
record.
5. Perhaps the most important component of an "efficient
remedy" from a practical point of view is the availability of a
stay of execution pending final determination of the issue of
confiscation. During the Senate debate on the Johnson bill
Senator Austin offered an amendment46 to insert at the end:
which remedy includes the right of such public utility to a stay of
such order pending final adjudication as to the repugnance of such order
to the Constitution of the United States.
The amendment was rejected, but in 1936 in Mountain States
Power Co. v. Public Service Commission," the United States
Supreme Court held the Act inapplicable where a state statute
prohibited the issuance of a stay. Again in Driscoll v. Edison
Co."5 the Supreme Court held the Act inapplicable for want of
a stay under the Pennsylvania law. "The remedy at law by
appeal is ineffective to protect the utility's position pendente
lite. The supersedeas does not postpone the application of the
temporary rates."" It seems dear, therefore, that an "efficient
remedy" involves the availability, at least, of a stay of execu-
tion. The fact that the stay is discretionary and not granted as
of right does not prevent the application of the Act.50
Summarizing the above rulings of the federal courts under
the Act: the remedy must be free from serious doubt or uncer-
tainty under the state law; it must be judicial in nature, not
legislative; in scope of review it must, probably, comply with
the rule of the Ben Avon case, authorizing an independent
judgment on the facts; a stay of execution must be available.
46 Cong. Rec. Vol. 78, pt. 2, p. 2238.
47 z99 U.S. 167 (1936).
48 307 U.S. 104 (i939).
4 From the opinion by Mr. Justice Reed at page i io, id.
50 New Jersey Suburban Water Co. v. Board of Public Utility Comm'rs,
supra, note 37. As to the effect of the denial by the state court of an applica-
tion for a stay, compare Oklahoma Natural Gas Co, v. Russell, inzfra, note 61,
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In applying these criteria to the Ohio law it is necessary
at the outset to draw a distinction between orders of the Public
Utilities Commission, on the one hand, and municipal rate
ordinances before appeal to the commission, on the other hand.
With respect to commission orders, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is exclusive under General Code, Section 549:
No court other than the supreme court shall have power to review,
suspend or delay any order made by the commission, or enjoin, restrain
or interfere with the commission or any member thereof in the per-
formance of official duties ....
Municipal rate ordinances in the pre-commission stage are not
within this statute and the general equity powers of the common
pleas courts are not affected thereby.
Orders of the Public Utilities Commission
The review of commission orders by the Supreme Court is
governed by General Code, Section 544:
A final order made by the commission shall be reversed, vacated or
modified by the supreme court on appeal, if upon consideration of the
record such court is of the opinion that such order was unlawful or
unreasonable.
Such review is judicial in character. The leading case is Hock-
ing Valley Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission," the first
syllabus reading as follows:
Section 544 et seq., General Code, enacted pursuant to the pro-
vision in the judicial article of the Ohio constitution as amended in
1912, that this court shall have such revisory jurisdiction of the pro-
ceedings of administrative officers as may be conferred by law, provide
for full judicial review of the proceedings and final orders of the Public
Utilities Commission and do not violate the guaranties of the federal
or state constitution.
Such review complies with the rule of the Ben Avon case.
1 oo Ohio St. 321 (1919). See also Van Wert Gaslight Co. v. P. U. C.,
supra, note 3; Grubb v. P. U. C., 281 U.S. 470 (1930); and cases cited
supra, note 44, wherein decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court under OHIo
GENERAL CODE, Section 544 were reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court.
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Following is a quotation from the opinion by Judge Gorman
in East Ohio Gas Company v. Public Utilities Commission:2
It is necessary for this court to review both the law applied and the
evidence to ascertain whether the order was 'unlawful or unreasonable.'
Section 544, General Code; . . . Generally, through a long line of de-
cisions it has been held that if the legal rule applied by the commission is
erroneous or if the facts found are manifestly against the weight of the
evidence, the order should be reversed.... But in determining whether
a rate is confiscatory it is necessary for the court to examine the
evidence anew and exercise its independent judgment, Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben 4von ....
In determining whether a rate schedule may be stayed,
modified or suspended pending final determination of the issue
of confiscation, two factual situations must be differentiated.
First, the utility is contending that a proposed new rate, fixed
by the commission originally or on appeal from a municipality,
is confiscatory and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The stay in such a case is made available by General Code,
Section 548:
No proceeding to reverse, vacate or modify a final order rendered
by the commission shall operate to stay execution thereof unless the
supreme court or a judge thereof in vacation, on application and three
days' notice to the commission, shall allow such stay ....
This statute, however, would furnish no relief in the second
type of situation in which the utility is objecting to an existing
rate schedule as confiscatory in the light of changed economic
conditions or other factors not present at the time of its pro-
mulgation. Under such circumstances the utility might rely
upon General Code, Section 614-32 which provides:
The commission shall have power, when deemed by it necessary
to prevent injury to the business or interests of the public or any public
utility of this state in case of any emergency to be judged by the com-
mission, to temporarily alter, amend, or with the consent of the public
52 133 Ohio St. 21Z, 217 (1938).
53 See also Hocking Valley Ry. v. P. U. C., supra, note 51 ; cases cited
supra, note 44. Compare Ohio Utilities Co. v. P. U. C., io8 Ohio St. 143
(19z3), reversed by the United States Supreme Court, 267 U.S. 359 (1925)
for failure to follow the Ben Avon rule.
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utility concerned suspend any existing rates, schedules or order relating
to or affecting any public utility or part of any public utility in this
state. Such rates so made by the commission . . . shall take effect at
such time and remain in force for such length of time as may be
prescribed by the commission.
This section, authorizing a temporary modification of rates
in an emergency "to prevent injury to the business . . . of
any public utility," has been considered by the Ohio Supreme
Court and by the commission in several cases, and held not
applicable in certain situations.
I. It does not authorize the temporary suspension or modi-
fication of the interim rate chargeable during the pendency of
an appeal of a municipal rate ordinance under Sections 614-44
et seq. Such rate is fixed by Section 614-45:
No such complaint or appeal to the commission shall suspend, vacate,
or set aside the rate, price, charge, toll or rental fixed by ordinance
unless such public utility shall elect to charge the rate, price, charge, toll
or rental in force and affect immediately prior to the taking effect of
the regulation complained of and appealed from and shall give an under-
taking in such amount as the commission shall determine....
This interim rate, the rate in effect immediately prior to the
ordinance complained of, remains in effect during the pendency
of the proceedings and is not subject to temporary change under
Section 614-32."4 The question whether a utility, voluntarily
54 City of Cleveland v. P. U. C., IZ6 Ohio St. 91 (1932) ; Re Colum-
bus Gas and Fuel Co., No. 5935, 1930 Ohio P. U. C. R., x88, P. U. R.
I93oC, 252; Re Columbus Gas and Fuel Co., No. 5935, 1931 Ohio P. U.
C.R. 95, P.U.R. 193IC, 244. These decisions are based upon OHIO GEN-
ERAL CODE, Section 614-47, which provides that rates fixed by municipal
ordinance under Section 3982 shall be governed only by Section 614-44, -4-5,
and -46 of the act of May 31, 1911, 102 Ohio Laws 549 et seq. (thereby
excluding Section 614-32).
The application of these rulings is not confined to interim rates pending
appeal from a municipal ordinance. By virtue of Section 614-47, municipal
rate ordinances are apparently not subject to temporary suspension or modifi-
cation by the commission under Section 614-32 at any stage, whether or not
appealed from. In the absence of an appeal, however, a remedy in equity in
the common pleas court would presumably be available, since Section 549
would not apply, assuming, of course, that the ordinance could be shown to
have become confiscatory by reason of changed conditions. See discussion
infra, this article, on the availability of the equitable remedy generally.
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appealing from a municipal rate ordinance to the commission
under Section 614-44 and electing to continue the interim rate
specified by Section 614-45, may be heard to contend that the
interim rate is confiscatory by reason of economic factors
developing after the date of the appeal, is beyond the scope of
this article. 4a If the issue of confiscation could be raised under
such circumstances, the Johnson Act probably would not bar
proceedings in the federal district court.
2. Section 614-32 does not authorize the alteration of rates
fixed by contract," but obviously no issue of confiscation is
involved in such cases.5
Accordingly the application of Section 614-32 appears to
be confined to rates approved or fixed by the commission orig-
inally pursuant to Sections 614-20o et seq. If such rates become
confiscatory relief may no doubt be had under Section 614-32Y
And if relief is improperly denied by the commission an appeal
to the Supreme Court will lie under Section 544.8
Municipal Rate Ordinances
Municipal ordinances in Ohio are but the "initial steps in
the legislative scheme for establishing rates," 9 being subject
54a This would depend, presumably, upon the significance to be attached
to the word "elect" in section 614-45, how far such an election to continue
the former existing rate pending appeal may preclude a subsequent claim of
confiscation based upon supervening conditions.
'-'City of Columbus v. P. U. C., 103 Ohio St. 79 (19z i); City of Akron
v. P. U. C., iz6 Ohio St. 333 (i933).
" Cols. Ry. P. and L. Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U.S. 399 (I919).
W Logan Gas Co. v. P. U. C., i 15 Ohio St. 107, ii8 (19z6): "The
utility contends that if it is precluded from claiming an increased rate during
the time which is spread over the investigation its property is confiscated. In
view of the existence of Section 614-32, this statement may be questioned."
Re Central U. Tel. Co., No. i9oo, P.U.R. i9zIC, 333 (abstract).
But see dictum by Marshall, C. J., in concurring opinion, City of Colum-
bus v. P. U. C., io3 Ohio St. 79, 113: "Surely, even if the business of the
utility is temporarily conducted at a loss, no emergency is presented .... We
have no hesitation in holding that such situations are not emergencies."
5 City of Columbus v. P. U. C., 103 Ohio St. 79, 113: "The commission
is to judge the emergency, but its judgment will be reversed on review if
'unreasonable and unlawful.'" (Also from concurring opinion by Marshall,
C. J.).
"East Ohio Gas Co. v. Cleveland, supra, note 9, from the opinion of
the district court, 23 F. Supp. 965.
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to appeal to the Public Utilities Commission under General
Code, Sections 614-44 et seq. Under the rule of Prentis v. At-
lantic Coast Line Co.," regardless of the Johnson Act, a federal
court will not exercise jurisdiction prior to the exhaustion of
the legislative remedy provided by state law, unless the utility
is threatened with "daily confiscation" during the pendency of
the proceedings."' As indicated above the interim rate during
the pendency of an appeal to the commission is fixed by Gen-
eral Code, Section 614-45, as the rate in effect immediately
prior to the new ordinance which is the subject of the appeal.
If the new rate ordinance is objectionable and allegedly con-
fiscatory as involving a substantial reduction in existing rates,
then in most cases the interim rate so prescribed, being the
existing higher rates, would adequately protect the utility
pending appeal, and no case of daily confiscation would be
stated. The legislative remedy by appeal being adequate, the
federal court would decline to step in, under the rule of the
Prentis case, requiring the prior exhaustion of such remedy. 2
On the other hand, if the new ordinance, as often happens,
merely continues the existing rate schedule which has allegedly
become confiscatory through changed conditions, the protection
afforded by Sections 614-45 may not be adequate. Such a case
60 Supra, note 22.
61 Olahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (9z3); Pacific
Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924).
2 In the opinion of Judge Hough in Columbus Gas and Fuel Co. v.
City of Columbus, 17 F. (zd) 630 (19z7) supra, note 3, there is no mention
of the Prentis case. The bill of complaint alleges that the rates contained in
the earlier ordinance (the statutory interim rates pending appeal to the com-
mission), although substantially higher than those in the ordinance complained
of, were also confiscatory, thereby stating a case of "daily confiscation." It is
also alleged that the commission on appeal would have no authority to alter the
period of the ordinance or to modify the provision prescribing the B.T.U.
content of the gas-in other words, that the scope of the review provided by
statute was too narrow to afford relief as against all the allegedly confiscatory
features of the ordinance. Presumably, the court exercised jurisdiction on the
basis of these allegations, tending to show the inadequacy of the legislative
remedy. This case arose long before the Johnson Act, and the availability of
a remedy in equity in the state courts then had no bearing upon the question
of federal jurisdiction.
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is suggested in the minority report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the Johnson bill. 3 This is the situation which
was presented in East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Cleveland,
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in 1938 and referred to above."4 It is recognized in the opinion
of the district judge 5 that under such circumstances the appel-
late procedure prescribed by Sections 614-44 et seq. involving
as it does the continuance of the prior existing rate during the
pendency of the proceedings, would be no protection against
daily confiscation, assuming such existing rate to be confiscatory.
But the court, applying the Johnson Act, declines to take juris-
diction, finding that a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" is
available in equity in the state courts. Following is a quotation
from the opinion of the District Court:
Ohio has no statute which will prevent its courts from granting
plaintiff relief against daily confiscation which it charges, assuming the
truth of the charge.
and from the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals:
The court further found that the appellant had a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy in equity in the state courts, and with that finding we
also agree.
The Ohio case relied upon was State ex rel. City of Cleveland
v. Court of Appeals,6 where the action of the Court of Appeals
in fixing an interim rate substantially higher than the prior
existing ordinance, the difference to be impounded, pending
further proceedings, was approved by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly it may be concluded that if, in a particular
situation, the appellate procedure applicable to municipal rate
ordinances may be regarded as inadequate, a "plain, speedy and
efficient remedy" is available in equity in the state courts," and
63 Senate Reports, No. 125, pt. 2, 73rd Cong. ist Sess.
(4 Supra, note 9.
65 23 F. Supp. 965, supra, note 9.
66 104 Ohio St. 96 (I9zz). For further proceedings in the same case
see East Ohio Gas Co. v. Cleveland, io6 Ohio St. 489 (192Z). See also
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, 107 Ohio St. 173 (1923).
67 In Phipps v. School District of Pittsburgh, i I F. (2d) 393 (C.C.A.,
3rd Circ., 1940), aff'g z6 F. Supp. 8i , supra, note 26, the effect of laches,
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relief in the federal court will be denied, assuming that the
other conditions of the Act have been met.
SUM MARY
I. Whether an order of the commission has been made, or
a municipal rate ordinance enacted, after "reasonable notice and
hearing," is a question of fact in each case.
2. The Ohio procedure for the review of commission orders
by the Supreme Court affords a "plain, speedy and efficient
remedy," except possibly with respect to an interim rate fixed
under General Code, Section 614-45, which has become con-
fiscatory by reason of supervening conditions.
3. The state courts afford a "plain, speedy and efficient
remedy" in equity in any case in which the statutory remedy
for the review of municipal rate ordinances by the commission
may be inadequate.
These conclusions appear to the writer to be supported by
the rulings of the federal courts down to the present time,
points I and 3 being based more particularly upon the decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in East
Ohio Gas Company v. Cleveland."5 The ultimate importance
of the Johnson Act and its subsequent development will depend
in part upon future rulings of the United States Supreme Court
on the substantive issues of confiscation, which will determine
the desirability from the point of view of the public utility of
a resort to the federal, rather than the state courts, and the
prospects for obtaining injunctive relief.
barring the complainant from relief in the state court, is considered: "The
efficiency of the remedy is not to be measured by the limitations upon the relief
allowable to a particular complainant who has been guilty of laches." The
court then lays down the following standard for judging the efficiency of the
equitable remedy: "The requirement of the amendment to the Judicial Code
of August 2i, 1937, relates to the remedy generally in the state courts; and,
the test of the efficiency of the remedy in equity is whether the state court's
jurisdiction is competent for a hearing of the complaint on its merits and the
final disposition of the matter by the entry of a decree adequate to the rights
of the parties, with power in the court to protect its jurisdiction and to enforce
its decrees by writs of injunction or other process." This case was decided
under the tax limitation amendment of 1937 which adopted the language of
the Johnson Act. See footnote z6, supra.
rs Supra, note 9.
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